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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams
by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the
optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private,
profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public
and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this
environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university
may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for
global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution
has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private
institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When
this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices.
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1 Introduction
European public universities have traditionally relied on exams, rather than prices,
to select their students, while operating costs have been covered largely by general
taxation. The often poor attainment of these universities has recently called for
higher fees and decentralization, whereas private institutions are being welcome to
enter the higher education sector.
These tendencies raise a new interest in the role of prices in higher education
and of competition among private and increasingly decentralized public universities.
Are there any reasons other that the obvious increasing budgetary constraints for a
public university to raise prices? Can this decision be conditional on the existence
and behavior of a private university?
The aim of this paper is to study the strategic choice of exams and prices by
educational institutions (e.g. universities) in competition.
In order to do that, let us start by recalling the main difference between prices
and exams as allocation devices: while fees make students self-select according to
willingness and ability to pay, exams are used by schools to select students according
to revealed ability to learn. Willingness to pay is a good approximation for student
ability to learn as long as the marginal return to education of higher quality is
larger for higher ability students. This is the case if student ability and school
quality are complements in the production of education, which seems a reasonable
assumption in the case of higher education. In this case, and in the absence of
credit constraints, students make adequate choices regarding their enrollment to
existing schools. Markets and exams could then be equivalent allocation devices for
the universities. However, it is generally acknowledged that the existence of credit
constraints prevents a pure price mechanism from attaining the optimal allocation
of students to schools of different quality. It is in this context that Fernandez (1998)
and Fernandez and Gali (1999) show the superiority of exams in terms of welfare
when the exam technology is sufficiently powerful.1
Still, the reaction to the existence of borrowing constraints may differ according
to the objectives of the university and the market conditions. Concerning the first,
1There are other reasons why a price mechanism may not attain the optimal allocation. For
example, higher education is a risky investment and the aversion to risk makes that, even in
absence of borrowing constraints, individual decisions are not optimal. Therefore, even if several
countries are introducing financing schemes that aim at eliminating credit constraints, this does
not guarantee that prices alone will be optimal. We then consider credit constraints as a simple
way to model general mismatches between decentralized and optimal decisions.
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we consider two limiting cases: a public university that maximizes total student
surplus and a private institution that maximizes profits. This specification of pub-
lic/private firm payoffs is extreme, though usual in the literature on mixed oligopolies
(see De Fraja and Delbono (1990), Cremer et al. (1991) and Grilo (1994)). It is
also the specification used by Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2004), who study the role
of prices and exams in presence of asymmetries of information concerning student
ability and with borrowing constraints. There is no competition in their work, but
they consider two types of university: a philanthropic university and a for-profit or
rent-seeking university.
In what can be considered a simplified version of their model, we study the
behavior of these institutions when isolated and in presence of borrowing constraints.
In order to explore the strategic value of exams and prices, we next let the two types
of institutions share the market.
In this paper, public universities care for the welfare of the whole student body.
Indeed, being totally funded by public money, it seems reasonable to assume their
not caring for own students alone. It is, in this sense, as if we considered the public
sector in competition with the private.
We show that, in presence of credit constraints, the public university sets the
lowest possible price while the use of exams allows to maintain the quality of enroll-
ments. In contrast, the private university may choose to combine prices and exams.
These results are consistent with Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2004) and are used here
as a benchmark.
With competition, we show that the public university may have an interest in
raising its price above the minimum when it cares for global welfare. Such higher
fee has the effect of increasing enrollments at the private institution while limiting
the access to the public institution, and may increase global welfare provided that
1. the private university has higher quality and it does not use exams to select
students
2. the private university has lower quality and it does use exams to select appli-
cants
There are, hence, efficiency grounds for raising public prices. This is also what
Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2004) concludes, albeit for different reasons. In their
case, the mix of prices and exams proves useful when there is bilateral asymmetric
information: both students and universities have some information about student
ability that the other does not have.
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The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model. We describe
the characteristics and behavior of students and universities and introduce the alter-
native allocation devices. Section 3 analyzes the monopoly benchmark referred to
both a public and a private monopoly. Section 4 considers competition and section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Individuals
The economy consists of a continuum of individuals i of measure one, characterized
by a different ability, ai , and by an initial income endowment, wi , both uniformly
and independently distributed over the interval [0, 1] × [a−, a+] with a+ − a− = 1.
Individuals derive utility from their total lifetime income, which consists of their
initial income endowment, wi , and their earnings if they become educated, aiQj,
where Qj is the educational quality provided by university j. Thus, ability and
educational quality are complements in the production of human capital.2 Therefore,
a student i with ability ai and income wi and enrolled at university j of quality Qj
and charging a price pj enjoys the following utility:
U ij = wi − pj + aiQj. (1)
2.2 Universities
We consider universities that produce educational services of a given quality.3 In
this sense, the analysis can be considered to take a short run approach, with quality
changes taking place only in the long run.
Public and private universities differ in their objectives: while the public univer-
sity maximizes welfare (the difference between utility generated and costs incurred),
the private institution maximizes profits.
2This assumption is crucial to characterize the efficient allocation of students in our model and
standard in the literature.
3In ongoing research, we consider a three stage game in which quality is chosen first, then prices
and exams (see Romero and Del Rey, 2004). In that work, the public university cares only for own
students’ surplus. It is easy to verify that, in this case, there is no competition as such. The high
quality institution behaves as a monopoly and the other one takes leftovers at choice, provided
that some market share is left available, without further interacting with the first.
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University j (where j = pb, pv stand respectively for public and private) incurs
per capita costs Cj(aj), where aj is the average ability of the student body at
university j. This cost is assumed to be decreasing and convex in the average ability
of the student body aj, C
′
j < 0, C
′′
j > 0. In order to guarantee the concavity of the
payoffs, the cost function is assumed to be sufficiently convex.4
The timing is the following: given quality, universities choose a price and ob-
serve demand. Then, they decide whether to run an exam in order to limit the
quantity/quality of admissions. Prices and/or limiting admission grades are charac-
terized as allocation mechanisms as follows.
Exams Suppose first that some regulation in place compels universities from op-
timally setting their fees. In such a case, the university may use an entry exam to
select the best students among those who are willing to attend the university. In
order to do so, it establishes a minimum score, sE such that those who obtain a
score equal or higher, si ≥ sE are accepted by the university. We assume the exam
technology to be able to perfectly reveal the student’s ability, which means that the
students obtaining a score s ≥ sE at university j = pb, pv are those with an ability
ai ≥ aEj .
Prices Suppose now that universities are not allowed to use exams as selection
devices but must fix the price of the services they provide. By choosing a price
pj, the university indirectly determines the type of students (characterized by their
ability and income) who are willing and able to enroll, given quality Qj.
When there is only one school, students compare their utility with and without
education. Let aˆj be the ability of the student who is indifferent between attending
school j and remaining uneducated:
wi = wi − pj + aˆjQj ⇒ aˆj = pj/Qj.
All students with ability a > aˆj are willing to attend university j. Among those,
only students with income w > pj are able to do so in the presence of liquidity
constraints.
4This simplification rules out potentially interesting results. Although a complete analysis of
the game between two universities would require accounting for all possible solutions, we leave this
matter for further research.
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3 The monopoly benchmark
We want to compare the reaction of public and private universities to the existence
of liquidity constraints in a situation in which there is only one institution, either
public or private, active in the higher education market. The objective of the public
institution is to maximize total surplus:
Upb =
∫ a+
ppb
∫ a+
apb
(aQpb − Cpb(apb)) da dw, (2)
where ppb is the public price, apb = max
{
âpb, a
E
pb
}
is the limiting admission grade
in the public university and apb =
a++apb
2
is the mean ability of students attending
the public university.
On the other hand, the private university maximizes profits:
Upv =
∫ a+
ppv
∫ a+
apv
(ppv − C(apv)) da dw, (3)
where ppv and apv = max
{
aEpv, âpv
}
stand respectively for prices and the mini-
mum ability at the private school and apv =
a++apv
2
is the mean ability of students
attending the private university.
Since we solve the problem backwards, we first look at the condition that defines
the optimal admission grade given prices. This may be larger than or equal to
the ability of the last student willing to attend the university, but will always be
smaller than a+ if the university takes students at all. Then we look at the choice
of prices. We need at this stage to consider two cases: either exams are going to be
used or not. In some cases we will find two optimal strategies, one with exams, the
other without. Which is the one resulting at equilibrium depends on the benefits
from limiting admissions, i.e. the cost technology. In other cases we will be able to
eliminate one of them by contradiction.
We first consider a public monopoly.
3.1 Public Monopoly
The optimal admission grade aEpb ≥ âpb is given by
−aEpbQpb + Cpb − (a+ − aEpb)C ′pb/2 ≤ 0. (4)
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At stage 1, the objective function of the public university is (2) with apb = max{âpb, aEpb}
and apb =
a++apb
2
. The optimal public price is given by:
−
(
a+ − apb2
2
Qpb − (a+ − apb)Cpb
)
+
∂apb
∂ppb
(1− ppb)
(−apbQpb + Cpb − (a+ − apb)C ′pb/2) = 0. (5)
If aEpb ≥ âpb is not binding, (4) is satisfied with equality and (5) is negative
provided that the university payoff is positive,5
a+ − apb2
2
Qpb − (a+ − apb)Cpb > 0 (6)
If, on the other hand, aEpb ≥ âpb is binding, (4) is negative and so is (5). Therefore,
(5) is always negative and the optimal price goes to zero. The allocation of students
is determined by (4).
3.2 Private Monopoly
The optimal limiting admission grade aEpv ≥ âpv is given by
−ppv + Cpv − (a+ − aEpv)C ′pv/2 ≤ 0. (7)
The optimal private price is, in turn, given by:
(1− 2ppv + Cpv)
(
a+ − apv
)− ∂apv
∂ppv
(1−ppv)
(
ppv − Cpv + (a+ − apv)C ′pv/2
)
= 0. (8)
We may identify two types of optimal policy depending on the production tech-
nology represented by the cost function.
In the first type, the benefits of limiting admissions in terms of lower costs are
not enough to compensate the loss of revenues. Then aEpv = apv and selection via
exams does not take place. (7) is negative and (8) has an interior solution at some
ppv < (1 + Cpv)/2.
In the second type of optimum aEpv > âpv. (7) is satisfied with equality and exams
take place at the last stage. The optimal price is ppv = (1 + Cpv)/2.
6 Whether one
type or the other results in equilibrium depends entirely on the cost technology.
5Note that, otherwise, the operating costs of the public university would exceed its contribution
to welfare, so that its mere existence would be unjustified.
6Note that we are unable to compare the optimal price corresponding to each case since Cpv is
lower the higher the average ability of enrolled students.
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Therefore, when we have a monopoly of higher education, if it is a public
monopoly it will set the lowest possible price and select students via exams. If
it is a private monopoly, it may set only prices or combine prices and exams de-
pending on the production technology, which determines the benefits of limiting
enrollments in terms of lower costs.
Let us now see how these choices may be affected by competition.
4 Competition between Public and Private Uni-
versities
When there are two universities in the market, the shape of demand and hence of
the payoffs of the universities differ depending on students’ relative preferences for
both institutions (denoted by Â), which, in turn, depend upon chosen prices and
exogenous qualities. In order to determine the optimal choices of the institutions
at stake, we first need to characterize the set of possible market partitions and
corresponding payoffs.
We then start with the characterization of students’ preferences given qualities
and prices.
We denote by a˜j ∈ [a−, a+] the ability of the individual who is indifferent be-
tween both universities when Qj ≥ Q−j. From (1):
a˜i =
pj − p−j
Qj −Q−j for j = pb, pv.
On the other hand, there may also exist an individual with ability âj ∈ [a−, a+] ,
j = pb, pv, who is indifferent between attending the school j or remaining unedu-
cated. As we saw before, âj = pj/Qj.
Let Case A refer to Qpb ≥ Qpv and Case B to Qpb < Qpv.
Case A.1. If Qpb ≥ Qpv, and the public, high-quality institution sets a lower
price, ppb < ppv all students who want to attend university prefer the public rather
than the private university: a˜pb < a
− < âpb < âpv, which corresponds to the following
ordering of preferences:
- ai ∈ (a−, âpb) : 0 Â pb Â pv.
- ai ∈ (âpb, âpv) : pb Â 0 Â pv.
- ai ∈ (âpv, a+] : pb Â pv Â 0.
Of those rejected from the public university (a < aEpb), some are willing and can
afford to attend the private university. These are individuals of ability a ≥ âpv and
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initial endowment w ≥ ppv. Of course, for this case to be relevant, we need that
the limiting admission grade at the public university aEpb > âpv. Otherwise, students
rejected from the public university would prefer to remain uneducated and we would
be facing a public monopoly.
Figure 1 represents the allocation of students to universities in this case.
The payoffs of the universities are then:
Upb =
∫ 1
ppb
∫ a+
apb
(aQpb − Cpb(apb)) da dw +
∫ 1
ppv
∫ apb
apv
(aQpv − Cpv(apv)) da dw, (9)
and
Upv =
∫ 1
ppv
∫ apb
apv
(ppv − Cpv(apv)) da dw, (10)
where apb = (a
+ + apb) /2, apv = (apb + apv) /2, apb = max{aˆpb, aEpb} and apv =
max{aˆpv, aEpv} and we assume aEpb > aˆpv.
Conversely, if the price of the public high-quality university is higher than the
price of its private competitor, we must differentiate two cases:
• ppb
ppv
>
Qpb
Qpv
, which is equivalent to aˆpb > aˆpv and also to a˜pb > âpb by definition
of a˜j, aˆj for j = pb, pv. Therefore, we obtain the following ordering of ability
thresholds âpv < âpb < a˜pb, which corresponds to the following ordering of
preferences:
- ai ∈ (a−, âpv) : 0 Â pv Â pb
- ai ∈ (âpv, âpb) : pv Â 0 Â pb.
- ai ∈ (âpb, a˜pb) : pv Â pb Â 0.
- ai ∈ (a˜pb, a+] : pb Â pv Â 0.
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• ppb
ppv
<
Qpb
Qpv
, which is equivalent to aˆpb < aˆpv and also to a˜pb < aˆpb. The ordering
of ability thresholds is thus, aˆpv > âpb > a˜pb and the preference ordering is the
following:
- ai ∈ (a−, a˜pb) : 0 Â pv Â pb.
- ai ∈ (a˜pb, âpb) : 0 Â pb Â pv.
- ai ∈ (âpb, âpv) : pb Â 0 Â pv.
- ai ∈ (âpv, a+] : pb Â pv Â 0.
Therefore, when both public prices and quality are higher, enrollments can follow
one of these patterns:
ppb > ppv

ppb
ppv
>
Qpb
Qpv
⇒ âpv < âpb < a˜pb
{
aEpb > a
E
pv,
aEpb < a
E
pv,
[1]
[2]
ppb
ppv
<
Qpb
Qpv
⇒ a˜pb < âpb < aˆpv
{
aEpb > a
E
pv,
aEpb < a
E
pv,
[3]
[4]
where all aEj are assumed to be non binding or interior (otherwise they would not
be responsible for the shape of the payoff). What is meant by this table is to make
clear that, whatever the ordering of student preferences, it is always possible for the
universities to change the pattern of enrollments by means of the limiting admission
grade. Ultimately, we are only concerned by such final patterns of enrollments or
market partitions. Therefore, we group subcases together as follows.
Case A.2. Since the shape of the payoff functions is the same in both cases
(albeit for different reasons), we group [2] and [4] in Case A.2 which hence studies
the possibility that the private institution enrolls students of higher average quality
when public quality is larger. Graphically,
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The payoffs of the universities are in this case
Upb =
∫ 1
ppb
∫ a+
aEpb
(aQpb − Cpb (apb)) da dw +
∫ ppb
ppv
∫ a+
aEpv
(aQpv − Cpv (apv)) da dw,
(11)
where apb =
(
a+ + aEpb
)
/2 and apv =
(
a+ + aEpv
)
/2.
Upv =
∫ ppb
ppv
∫ a+
aEpv
(ppv − Cpv(apv)) da dw. (12)
Although this case is in principle feasible, note that if the objective of the public
university is to maximize global welfare, it will always be better off by setting prices
at zero than by letting some good students attend the private low quality school.
We can, for this reason, disregard this case.
Case A.3. Similarly, we group [1] and [3] together in Case A.3, which analyzes
the possibility that the public university is more selective when its price is higher.
Figure 3 represents the market partition corresponding to this case:
The payoffs of the universities are
Upb =
∫ 1
ppb
∫ a+
apb
(aQpb − Cpb (apb)) dw da+
∫ ppb
ppv
∫ a+
apb
(aQpv − Cpv (apv)) da dw
+
∫ 1
ppv
∫ apb
apv
(aQpv − Cpv (apv)) da dw, (13)
and
Upv =
∫ ppb
ppv
∫ a+
apb
(ppv − Cpv(apv)) da dw +
∫ 1
ppv
∫ apb
apv
(ppv − Cpv(apv)) da dw, (14)
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where apb =
(
a+ + aEpb
)
/2 and
apv =
(
a+ − a2pb
)
(ppb − ppv) +
(
a2pb − a2pv
)
(1− ppv)
2 ((a+ − apb) (ppb − ppv) + (apb − apv) (1− ppv)) , (15)
where apb = max
{
aEpb, âpb, a˜pb
}
and apv = max
{
aEpv, âpv
}
.
A similar procedure identifies all possible enrollment patterns when Qpv > Qpb
(case B). By substituting subscripts pv and pb by each other we obtain cases B.1,
B.2 and B.3.
In the following sections, we successively assume to be in each case in order to
study the corresponding optimal choice of prices and exams. Note that, as we vary
prices (and/or limiting admission grades), the demand schedules change smoothly,
without giving rise to discontinuities in the changes of regime. The payoffs are hence
continuous.
We start our analysis with Case A.1, characterized by Qpb > Qpv and ppb < ppv.
4.1 Case A.1
Since Qpb > Qpv and ppb < ppv the public university is preferred by all the potential
students. Then, for the private university to have access to the market, it has to be
the case that the public university uses selective exams. Moreover, the private school
cannot be more selective, otherwise it would not even be in the market. For case A.1
to result in equilibrium we then need that aEpb > apv, where apv = max
{
aEpv, aˆpv
}
.
Hence, some students willing to attend the public university are rejected admis-
sion there and turn to the private university, as they prefer to pay for lower quality
rather than being left uneducated (see Figure 1).
Exams At this stage, prices, and hence demand, are taken as given by the uni-
versity.
The objective of the public university is to maximize (9) subject to aEpb ≥ 0. The
objective of the private university is to maximize (10) subject to aEpv ≥ aˆpv.
The first order condition that determines the limiting admission grade at the
public university is satisfied with equality for the reasons just explained and writes
(1− ppb)
(−aEpbQpb + Cpb − (a+ − aEpb)C ′pb/2) (16)
+ (1− ppv)
(
aEpbQpv − Cpv − (aEpb − apv)C ′pv/2
)
= 0.
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The private university chooses a limiting admission grade aEpv ≥ aˆpv such that
−ppv + Cpv − (aEpb − aEpv)C ′pv/2 ≤ 0. (17)
Intuitively, as before, the constraint aEpv ≥ aˆpv is binding if the reduction in costs
when raising the minimum ability is small compared to the loss in revenues. If the
reduction in costs due to the enrollment of more able students is not too large, it is
not worth being selective (which after all has a cost since it reduces enrollments and
hence revenues) and all students willing to enroll are accepted. If, on the contrary,
the benefits of raising the average ability of the student body are larger than the
costs in terms of reduced revenues, the private university will use selective exams.
Prices The public university chooses ppb so as to maximize (9). The optimal price
for the public university ppb is given by the following condition:
−
(
a+ − a 2pb
2
Qpb − (a+ − apb)Cpb
)
+
(1− ppv)
(−apvQpv + Cpv − (apb − apv)C ′pv/2) ∂apv∂ppb = 0 (18)
since apb = a
E
pb and with apv = max{aˆpv, aEpv}.
The contribution to welfare by the public university must be positive, since
otherwise its existence would be unjustified (global welfare would be larger without
it):
(1− ppb)(a+ − apb)
(
a+ + apb
2
Qpb − Cpb
)
> 0.
The first term in (18) is then negative. Still, the optimal price may be positive. For
this to be the case, the private institution needs to use exams, since
∂aˆpv
∂ppb
= 0.
In contrast, by a simple comparative static analysis,
∂aEpv
∂ppb
< 0. Moreover, if
apv = a
E
pv, (17) is satisfied with equality, which implies that a
E
pv > aˆpv and hence
ppv < a
E
pvQpv. We also know that te public university has higher quality than the
private and needs to be more selective for the two universities to share the market.
Then, ppv < a
E
pvQpv < a
E
pbQpv. As a result, the term −apvQpv+Cpv−(apb−apv)C ′pv/2
in (18) is negative. Therefore, the necessary (not sufficient) conditions for a positive
public price are satisfied when the private institution uses exams to select students.
We thus find that optimal public prices are zero if the lower quality private
institution does not use exams and may be positive if the private institution uses
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exams as a way to select applicants. The intuition underlying this result is the
following: public prices do not affect the willingness to attend the private school
(in any case, it is less preferred than the public) but may affect the choice of the
limiting admission grade at the private institution. If the public university cares for
global welfare, it will use its prices to ensure that a maximum of students get access
to higher education. There may be a trade-off: higher prices reduce enrollments at
public university of higher quality and may increase admissions at private university
of lower quality. The latter must be a large effect to make it worthwhile for the public
university to raise prices.
In turn, private prices are chosen to maximize (10) according to
∂aEpb
∂ppv
(1− ppv)
(
ppv − Cpv − (apb − apv)C ′pv/2
)
+ (19)
(1− 2ppv + Cpv) (apb − âpv)− ∂apv
∂ppv
(1− ppv)
(
ppv − Cpv + (a+ − apv)C ′pv/2
)
= 0
where apb = a
E
pb and apv = max{aˆpv, aEpv}. This condition, similar in qualitative terms
to (8) implies no fundamental difference in the behavior of the private institution
as result of competition, as long as the choice of strategic variable is concerned.
4.2 Case A.3
The allocation of students to schools is represented in this case by Figure 3. The
objective functions are given by (13) and (14). Average ability of students at the
public institution continues to be apb =
a++apb
2
.
Unfortunately, there is not much additional insight we can provide for this case,
which results when the benefits of raising public prices are so large that they become
larger than private prices. It is of course still necessary that the private institution
uses exams to select students for public prices to be positive.
The following proposition therefore summarizes our conclusions regarding the
use of exams and prices when there is competition between a public and a private
university, public quality is higher and there are credit constraints.7
Proposition 1 In the presence of borrowing constraints, if a public university shares
the market with a private university of lower quality (i) the private institution may
use both exams and prices (ii) public prices may be positive, but only if the lower
quality private institution uses exams as selective devices.
7Recall that quality is exogenously given in this paper.
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We the conclude that the public university may raise the price with respect to the
monopoly benchmark in order to influence the private’s behavior and thus maximize
welfare. For this to be the case, we need the lower quality private university to use
exams to select students.
4.3 Case B.2
We now turn to study the case in which private quality is higher. The symmetric
to case A.1, B.1, corresponds to Qpv > Qpb and ppb > ppv. In this case, all students
prefer the private school and the only possibility for the public school to stay in the
market with higher prices is that the private university uses selective exams. Still, in
this case, it can be simply verified (as will be made clearer in the following sections)
that the optimal public price is zero, which contradicts the initial assumptions. We
therefore disregard case B.1.
Otherwise, with Qpv > Qpb and ppv > ppb we have the possibility that the public
university accepts students who cannot afford to attend the private school but have
high ability. More specifically, we first study the case in which the average ability
of students in the public school is larger (symmetric to A.2). The payoffs of the
schools are
Upv =
∫ 1
ppv
∫ a+
apv
(ppv − Cpv (apv)) da dw,
Upb =
∫ 1
ppv
∫ a+
apv
(aQpv − Cpv (apv)) da dw +
∫ ppv
ppb
∫ a+
apb
(aQpb − Cpb(apb)) da dw,
where apb =
a++apb
2
and apv =
a++apv
2
.
Public exams are set according to (4) while the optimal exam at the private
institution is such that (7) is satisfied.
In fact, the private university also behaves as a monopoly when choosing prices,
that are chosen according to (8). If exams are used, the limiting admission grade
aEpv depends only on ppv. Still, if apv = a˜pv there may be some interaction with the
lower quality public institution.
Public prices now satisfy
−
(
a+ − a2pb
2
Qpb − (a+ − apb)Cpb
)
(20)
+
∂apb
∂ppb
(ppv − ppb)
(−apbQpb + Cpb − (a+ − apb)C ′pb/2)
+
∂apv
∂ppb
(1− ppv)
(−apvQpv + Cpv − (a+ − apv)C ′pv/2) = 0.
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The first term of this expression is negative, as before, if the contribution to welfare
by the public university is positive. The second term is smaller than or equal to zero,
depending on whether exams are used or not by the public university. Therefore,
public prices can only be positive provided that the last term is. We know that, if
the private university uses exams, ∂aEpv/∂ppb = 0 from (7) with apv =
a++aEpv
2
. Then,
public prices are zero and the private institution acts in complete isolation from the
public university, as a pure monopoly.
The presence of the public institution only affects the behavior of the private
when the latter uses prices alone to select students and ppv/ppb > Qpv/Qpb since
only in this case the last student enrolled at the private university is a˜pv.
8 From
(7), the last expression between brackets in (20) is smaller than zero. Hence, a
public university of lower quality may decide to set positive prices in order to induce
students to enroll at the high quality institution (∂a˜pv/∂ppb < 0), although at the
cost of leaving some good students uneducated. In contrast with the case where
private quality was lower, for a positive public price to be optimal we now need the
private school to use prices alone as a student allocation device.
4.4 Case B.3
Finally, case B.3 is the symmetric to A.3 and the payoffs of the schools are
Upv =
∫ 1
ppv
∫ a+
apv
(ppv − Cpv (apv)) da dw,
Upb =
∫ ppv
ppb
∫ a+
apv
(aQpb − Cpb(apb)) da dw +
∫ 1
ppb
∫ apv
apb
(aQpb − Cpb(apb)) da dw
+
∫ 1
ppv
∫ a+
apv
(aQpv − Cpv(apv)) da dw,
where apv = (a
+ + apv) /2 and apb =
(
a+ − a2pv
)
(ppv − ppb) +
(
a2pv − a2pb
)
(1− ppb)
2 ((a+ − apv) (ppv − ppb) + (apv − apb) (1− ppb)) .
Taking this into account, and given prices and limiting admission grades at the
private institution, the optimal admission grade at the public institution is given by
8To the left of aˆpv no schooling is preferred to attending the private institution. Therefore,
for a˜pb to be the ability of the last admitted at the private institution, this threshold needs to be
larger than aˆpv. See page 11 and shift the subscripts to account for the case where private quality
is higher.
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the condition:
−aEpbQpb + Cpb − (apv − apb)C ′pb
∂apb
∂aEpb
≤ 0. (21)
On the other hand, given ppv, the private university chooses the limiting admis-
sion grade under competition according to (7), just as under monopoly.
Finally, the optimal public price is now given by
−
(
a+ − a2pb
2
Qpb − (a+ − apb)Cpb
)
−C ′pb
∂apb
∂ppb
(
(1− ppb)(apv − apb) + (ppv − ppb)(a+ − apv)
)
+
∂apb
∂ppb
(1− ppb)
(
−apbQpb + Cpb − (apv − apb)C ′pb
∂apb
∂apb
)
+
∂apv
∂ppb
(
apv(1− ppv) (Qpb −Qpv)− (1− ppb)(a+ − apb)C ′pv/2
)
= 0. (22)
When the private university uses exams to select students (apv = a
E
pv) (22) is un-
ambiguously negative for the same reasons already exposed in the previous case.
Hence, the optimal public price tends to zero.
That the private institution does not use exams to select students is necessary,
although not sufficient, for positive prices to be welfare improving. On the one hand,
the ability of the last admitted at the private school must be, as before, apv = a˜pv.
This is true, as we have seen, if and only if the difference in prices is larger than the
difference in qualities.
Moreover, the only positive term in this case is
apv(1− ppv) (Qpb −Qpv) ∂a˜pv
∂ppb
> 0,
since Qpv > Qpb. Thus, on the one hand, the larger the difference in qualities, the
larger are the benefits of raising the public tuition fee, as more students are induced
to attend a university considerably better. But if the difference in qualities becomes
larger than the difference in prices, the private institution will start using exams to
determine admissions, thus remaining isolated from competition. The benefits of
increasing the public price will be lost.
Proposition 2 In the presence of borrowing constraints, if a public university com-
petes with a private university of higher quality
1. when the difference in quality is larger than the difference in price, the public
university sets the price equal to zero and does not affect the behavior of the
private, that behaves as a monopoly
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2. otherwise, the public university may set positive prices in order to maximize
global surplus provided that the high quality private university does not use
exams
Although private prices are determined at the margin simply as under the monopoly
benchmark (condition (8)), if a˜pv > aˆpv ⇔ Qpv/Qpb < ppv/ppb the last student ad-
mitted at the private university is of higher ability when there is a public competitor
of lower quality. The reason is that less students are willing to pay ppv when there
is a substitute for private education, even if it is of lower quality. Enrollments at
the private institution are in this case sensitive to the choice of price by the public
institution. It is for this reason that optimal public prices may be positive. Raising
the public price certainly leaves some good students out of the market due to credit
constraints, but may induce the private institution to expand, increasing overall
access to higher education.
If, on the other hand, the difference in qualities is larger than the difference in
prices Qpv/Qpb > ppv/ppb, there is no strategic interaction or effect of competition.
The existence of a public competitor of lower quality does not affect the behavior of
the private monopoly.
Summing up, we can conclude that optimal public prices can rise from zero
under certain circumstances when a public university that cares for global welfare
competes with a private university that maximizes profits. A necessary condition for
this to be the case is, if private quality is lower than public quality, that the private
institution uses exams to select students and, if private quality is higher than public
quality, that the private institution uses only prices.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the strategic role of prices and exams for public
and private universities in the presence of credit constraints. First, we have com-
pared the optimal choices of a public and a private monopoly. While the public
university sets minimum prices and selects students via exams, the private institu-
tion may choose to use both instruments, provided that the selection of the best
students lowers operating costs more than revenues.
When there is competition, the choice of instrument by the public university does
depend strongly on the instruments chosen by the private university. Positive (i.e.
higher) public prices can be optimal. For this to be the case we need that the private
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university has lower quality and uses exams to select students, or that it has higher
quality and uses only prices to select students. In these cases, the public university
can, by raising its price, increase enrollments at the private university. This will
clearly increase global welfare when the private university has higher quality and the
number of students who gain access to this higher quality is larger than the number of
students who become unable to afford the public university. Global welfare can also
increase when private quality is lower if the total number of university enrollments
increases as a result of the rise in the public price.
Although the model proposed is simple and some of the assumptions made are
debatable, this paper constitutes a first attempt in the literature to formalize the
choice of strategic variable by educational institutions in competition. Our conclu-
sions are original and shed a new light of the role of public prices in higher education.
References
[1] Cremer, H., Marchand, M. and Thisse, J.F. (1991). “Mixed Oligopoly with Dif-
ferentiated Products”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, pp.
43-53.
[2] De Fraja, G. and Delbono, F. (1990): Game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly.
Journal of Economic Surveys, 4.
[3] Fernandez, R. (1998). “Education and Borrowing Constraints: Tests versus
Prices”, NBER Working Paper No 6588.
[4] Fernandez, R. and Gali, J. (1999). “To Each According to...? Tournaments,
Markets and the Matching Problem under Borrowing Constraints”, Review of
Economic Studies 66 (4), pp.799-824.
[5] Gary-Bobo, R. and Trannoy, A. (2004): Efficient tuition fees, examinations, and
subsidies. Mimeo University of Paris 1 and EHESS, CREQAM.
[6] Grilo, I. (1994). “Mixed Duopoly under Vertical Differentiation”, Annales
d’Economie et de Statistique No 33.
[7] Romero, L. and Del Rey, E. (2004). Competition between Public and Private
Universities: Quality, Prices and Exams. Mimeo, Universidad Carlos III de
Madrid.
19
